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THE SHIELD OF “UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES”: ANALYZING VENTURE 
CAPITAL’S DEFENSE AGAINST INCREASED 
CARRIED INTEREST TAXATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress is considering two bills to treat carried interest, popular with 
private equity firms for its low tax rate, as just another form of general 
income for tax purposes. 1 As the debate over increasing taxation to 35%2 
on profits for general partners of private equity firms and from multi-billion 
dollar leveraged buyouts continues, other industries are becoming 
concerned.3 The issue of taxation on carried interest is even more complex 
than the headlines suggest. This is not only about buyout firms. In fact, 
politicians like Senator Charles Schumer have refused to support tax 
legislation that applies only to private equity4 and even the National 
Association of Realtors has stepped forward.5 Venture capitalists also rely 
on carried interest,6 and increased taxation would be a blow to their 
profitability. 
Other businesses are justifiably worried that congressional action will 
lead to “unintended consequences,”7 and both investors in start-ups and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007). Carried interest is a unique 
form of return on investment used by investment fund managers. Instead of being paid salaries, 
fund managers actively invest client’s money and receive payment for their management services 
with a percentage of the profits (interest) received on those investments. 
 2. The Taxation of Carried Interest: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 
15 (July 11, 2007) (testimony of Peter R. Orszag, Director of the Congressional Budget Office), 
available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/071107testpo.pdf 
[hereinafter Orszag Testimony] (“[O]rdinary income for high-income taxpayers is typically 
subject to a 35 percent marginal income tax rate and . . . [l]ong-term capital gains for such 
taxpayers are typically subject to a 15 percent tax rate.”). 
 3. Jessica Holzer, Realtors Take Aim at Private Equity Tax Hike Plan, THE HILL, Aug. 3, 
2007; Kevin Drawbaugh, Business Group Backs Carried Interest Tax Break, REUTERS, Sept. 4, 
2007; Minority Group Joins Fight Over Carried Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007; Energy 
master limited partnerships invest in and manage gas pipelines, which are capital intensive. See 
David Givens, Gas Processors Report: Is The Carry Going to Get You?, Aug. 15, 2007, available 
at 2007 WLNR 16173143. 
 4. Raymond Hernandez & Stephen Labaton, In Opposing Tax Plan, Schumer Breaks With 
Party, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2007, at A1. 
 5. Realtors are protesting tax increases on limited partnerships that rely on carried interest 
and that commonly invest in real estate. Holzer, supra note 3 (“The fact of the matter is that real 
estate is more broadly affected. It is a major stakeholder in this issue.”) (quoting Steve Renna, 
senior vice president and counsel to the Real Estate Roundtable). 
 6. See Marco V. Masotti, Private Equity Funds: Current Terms and Trends, 1617 PLI/CORP 
213 (2007). When venture capital funds invest in a company, they are given part ownership of the 
enterprise, which is called a profits interest (an interest in the profits). The fund receives returns 
on the investment when it realizes profits, but the portion of the return that the general partner 
takes for himself is carried interest. 
 7. Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, National Venture Capital Association 
Statement on Carried Interest Bill (June 22, 2007), http://www.nvca.org/pdf/ 
carriedinterestbillstatement.pdf. 
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sellers in the real estate market alike may find that the market may shift 
substantially if Congress decides to increase taxation of carried interest. 
This note argues that a tax increase on carried interest is a good idea, and 
private equity managers should be paying the same taxes that middle 
America does.8 The “unintended consequences”9 of increasing carried 
interest taxation are not as significant as 2007’s lobbying has made it seem, 
and many industries that may be affected by carried interest taxation are 
reasonable targets.10 Furthermore, proposed legislation will not increase 
taxes on all carried interest.11 Venture capital firms should be especially 
concerned because the strength and nature of venture capital business 
indicates that they should be more than a mere unintended target. 
The debate on carried interest also necessarily focuses on the 
underlying policy reasons for tax incentives in investment.12 Closing tax 
loopholes is commonplace and market economies are structured to respond 
to changing taxation naturally.13 There is money to be made in investment14 
and Congress should not believe the arguments made against increased 
taxation. Venture capitalists argue that they are unique in the carried interest 
debate and that they should be spared higher taxation for the sake of the 
American economy,15 but ranking Senate members in Washington are not 
easily convinced16 and there are many reasons to place venture capital in the 
same tax bracket as middle America. 
                                                                                                                 
 8. The average American worker pays the general income tax, which can be as high as 35%. 
Press Release, Citizens for Tax Justice, Myths and Facts About Private Equity Fund Managers – 
and the Tax Loophole They Enjoy (July 2007). 
 9. See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 7. 
 10. For discussion, see Part V.C. 
 11. Entrepreneurs who do not provide investment services and carried interest proportionate to 
personal investment will not be taxed. H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 12. See Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77 (Fall 2005). 
 13. See Michael S. Knoll, The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the 
Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for 
Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 07-20, 2007) (arguing that firms using carried interest have a 
variety of choices including shifting the tax burden if the carried interest loophole is closed). 
 14. Actual profit figures are unavailable because partnerships do not provide annual reports 
and investments paid out in carried interest are not taxed until realized, which is upon sale of a 
portfolio company. 
 15. GLOBAL INSIGHT, VENTURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE 
CAPITAL BACKED COMPANIES TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 5 (4th ed. 2007), 
http://www.nvca.org/pdf/NVCA_VentureCapital07.pdf (“Venture capital backed companies 
outperformed their non-ventured counterparts in job creation and revenue growth.”). 
 16. Press Release, Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, Carried 
Interest, Part 1: Opening Statement of Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.) (July 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/statements/071107mb.pdf (“The United States economy 
is strong and dynamic. Our entrepreneurship creates new jobs. We do not want to stifle the mother 
of invention. On the other hand, we wish to ensure fair treatment under the tax code.”); see also 
Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member of the S. Comm. on Finance, Statement of 
Sen. Chuck Grassley, Hearing, Carried Interest, Part 1 (July 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/statements/071107cg.pdf (“We can’t allow the carried 
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To understand why the proposed carried interest taxation is reasonable, 
it is necessary to look at why capital gains taxation exists. Venture 
capitalists believe that their returns on investment are distinct from other 
common issues of carried interest compensation. However, the reality of an 
efficient market and underlying policy issues suggest that venture capital 
should not be treated differently. Part II of this note provides a survey of the 
venture capital industry, including its recent growth and role in the 
American investment marketplace and explains how the industry will be 
affected by increased taxation. It also examines the nature of risk-taking (an 
issue to be addressed further in Part V.A) and profitability in the venture 
capital industry. Part III provides an introduction to carried interest and the 
lower capital gains taxation rate. It explains which industries commonly 
structure their businesses to take advantage of lower taxation and the 
difference between the proposed bills on carried interest. Part IV gives a 
survey of recent tax reform that affected venture capital. 
Part V addresses the arguments made by venture capitalists against 
increased taxation. Part V.A addresses the effects of changing the 
cost/benefit equation established in the industry, which includes the risk-
taking nature of the industry, the need for providing incentives to fund 
managers, and the likelihood that opportunities in the global investment 
landscape will encourage an exodus of American venture capital firms and 
managers. Part V.B provides justifications for altering the present definition 
of carried interest and treating it as income from services rendered as 
opposed to capital gain. Finally, Part V.C addresses the effects of shifting 
the tax burden, how other industries and investors will be affected, and how 
the policy reasons behind proposed legislation indicate that the venture 
capital industry is not an unintended casualty. 
II. SURVEY OF THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY 
Venture capital funds invest in companies that have not had a public 
offering of stock.17 Those companies market themselves to venture 
capitalists to attract investments when they need a significant capital outlay 
to expand their businesses.18 In return for providing money,19 venture 
capitalists are given equity in the business, and often a negotiated number 
of director seats so that the venture capital fund has a say in the 
                                                                                                                 
interest tail to wag the capital gains dog . . . I wouldn’t call it a no-brainer that all those [carried 
interest] profits should be taxed as a return on investment rather than a return on labor.”). 
 17. Masotti, supra note 6, at 215. 
 18. Id. at 215–16. 
 19. Venture capitalists typically provide between $10 million and $15 million in return for an 
ownership position. See Dwayne Moyers & Crystal Detamore-Rodman, Pursing Venture Capital: 
Determine Whether You’re a Good Candidate For Institutional VC Funding, 
ENTREPRENEUR.COM, June 20, 2007, http://www.entrepreneur.com/money/financing/ 
venturecapital/article180654.html. 
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management of the start-up.20 As such, venture capital funds do not simply 
provide cash to start-up companies; they also provide market expertise and 
constant, active management to help the business succeed and maximize its 
value.21 The goal of a venture capital fund is to invest in a private company 
and to expand the business until it can be sold for a profit to another 
company, or until the venture company can issue stock in an initial public 
offering (IPO).22 Arguably, an IPO is the best end-result for a venture 
investment because the private market for sale of a company is much 
smaller than the market for shares of a corporation. Therefore, a venture 
capital firm will be able to get the greatest dollar amount offered for its 
prior equity investment. 
Companies are divided into “stages” that help define how early in their 
business development they are prior to going public.23 Venture capital firms 
use stages as an investment strategy to diversify the group of companies 
they invest in and to consider what type of management assistance each 
company will need. Furthermore, staging investments and investing with 
other venture capital funds helps to limit the risk exposure of a fund.24 
Venture capitalists do not solely invest in companies that are months away 
from going public. In fact, less than half of the money invested in the 
second quarter of 2007 was invested in “later stage” companies.25 During 
that period, $221 million was invested in startup/seed companies, $1.388 
billion was invested in early-stage companies, $2.377 billion was invested 
in expansion companies and $3.142 billion was invested in later stage 
companies.26 In total, “[v]enture capitalists invested $7.1 billion in 977 
deals in the second quarter of 2007 — the highest level of deals reported in 
a quarter since Q3 2001.”27 Those figures indicate that venture capitalists 
can look forward to recording carried interest figures when their 
investments are sold or go public. 
                                                                                                                 
 20. “Carried Interest”: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. at 5 (July 11, 
2007) (testimony of Kate D. Mitchell, Managing Director of Scale Venture Partners), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/071107testkm.pdf [hereinafter 
Mitchell Testimony]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Moyers, supra note 19 (if the company can neither go public or be acquired, there is little 
opportunity for sufficient profit which would entice a venture capital fund to invest millions of 
dollars). 
 23. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the 
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 52–53 (2006). 
 24. Id. at 42. 
 25. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MONEYTREE REPORT: Q2 2007 US RESULTS at 4 
(2007), available at https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/moneytree/filesource/ 
exhibits/2Q07MoneyTree_Report.pdf (“later stage” companies are predicted to be the companies 
closest to an IPO). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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Venture capital investments appear risky because only 20% of venture-
backed companies “achieve realizable and meaningful gains.”28 Of the 
remaining 80%, half “lose some or all of the invested money,”29 and half 
“generate a modest profit.”30 To hedge their bets, “a venture fund might 
make investments in ten or fifteen portfolio companies.”31 Because multiple 
investments are required to spread the risk, venture capital funds will 
require investors to commit to investment prior to selecting their portfolio 
companies.32 Partners who invest money do not expect to see returns 
immediately; due to the nature of investing in companies, investments are 
usually for a period of five to ten years, at which time the company will 
hopefully go public.33 The final realized profit on an investment is the 
money raised from the IPO or sale. 
III. CARRIED INTEREST AND ITS USE IN PARTNERSHIPS 
Venture capital funds, buyout funds, hedge funds and “similar 
alternative investment vehicles”34 (each is a type of “private equity” fund) 
choose to structure their businesses as partnerships to avoid the corporate 
tax rate as well as other burdensome corporate regulations.35 In a 
partnership, profits pass through to the individual partners and the 
government taxes each individual partner instead of the entity as a whole.36 
The partnership structure gives businesspeople the flexibility to distribute 
profits in a more tax-efficient manner by allowing each partner to be taxed 
solely on his own investment.37 Private equity funds take advantage of that 
efficiency by structuring the partnership to separate the profits of the 
investors from those of management.38 Each investor becomes a limited 
partner and the general partner is a separate management entity.39 Investors 
provide the vast majority of capital, while the general partner manages the 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 7. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Fleischer, supra note 12, at 87. 
 32. Knoll, supra note 13, at 2. 
 33. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 7. 
 34. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS 
RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES, 
PART I, at 2 (Sept. 4, 2007) [hereinafter JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I]. 
 35. Orszag Testimony, supra note 2, at 5–6 (“[N]oncorporate forms of conducting business . . . 
were created in part to avoid the potential distortions associated with corporate taxation.”). 
 36. Testimony of Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Eric Solomon Before the Senate 
Committee on Finance, 110th Cong. 2 (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/ 
~finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/071107testes.pdf [hereinafter Solomon Testimony]. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Even though a manager’s return is taxed the same as a limited partner’s, his carried interest 
is contingent and is never proportionate to his own investment. See id. 
 39. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 3. 
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fund, provides expertise in deciding what investments to make and consults 
the companies it chooses in order to maximize the value of the investment.40 
In a typical private equity fund, the general partner’s compensation is 
“two and twenty.”41 For its services, the general partner receives a 2% 
management fee and 20% of the profits.42 More successful and well-known 
private equity funds can and do charge more.43 The management fee covers 
“ongoing operational expenses of the manager, such as rent, salary and 
other overhead items.”44 However, the real incentive for the manager is the 
profits,45 because successful management nets the general partner one-fifth 
of every dollar earned on the limited partner’s capital. “Carried interest” is a 
term that describes the general partner’s interest in the profits of the 
investment.46 Although 20% of profits may seem high when the general 
partner provides little or no capital, there is no shortage of willing 
investors,47 which suggests that 20% is a fair market rate. Investors prefer 
carried interest over a larger, flat management fee because it is 
economically efficient; it provides incentives for the general partner and, in 
turn, protects the investors from disinterested management who would 
otherwise collect a flat fee and have no incentive to actively monitor the 
investment.48 Furthermore, venture capitalists prefer carried interest 
specifically because tax legislation treats it as a return on investment.49 
Returns on capital investments receive beneficial taxation compared to 
general income, though there are exceptions.50 
If capital investments are made for a period longer than one year, they 
are taxed at a lower capital gains rate instead of the general income rate.51 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 5 (Limited partners in venture capital funds are 
usually “institutional investors such as pension funds, universities and endowments, and private 
foundations [that] typically provide between 95 to 99 percent of the capital for the fund”). 
 41. Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds 
(Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-27, 2007). 
 42. The management fee is typically 2% of the fund’s assets, not the profits. JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 3. 
 43. Masotti, supra note 6, at 223 (“a general partner with a strong track record may receive a 
carried interest percentage of as high as 25% to 30%”). 
 44. Id. at 227. 
 45. Joseph W. Bartlett, Why Plan to Change Carry Tax is Misguided, VENTURE CAPITAL J., 
Aug. 2007, at 31. 
 46. Masotti, supra note 6, at 223. 
 47. Fundraising for venture funds increased every year from 2002 ($3.8 Billion) to 2006 
($30.9 Billion), and “[t]he level of dollars raised by the firms suggests a continued demand by 
institutional investors for quality venture capital investment opportunities.” Press Release, Nat’l 
Venture Capital Ass’n, Venture Capital Fundraising Activity Healthy and Prudent in Second 
Quarter of 2007 (July 16, 2007), http://www.nvca.org/pdf/Q207VCFundraisingfinal.pdf (quoting 
Mark Heesen, president of the NVCA). 
 48. See Fleischer, supra note 41, at 5. 
 49. See Knoll, supra note 13, at 4. 
 50. Capital investments made for less than one year do not qualify for the capital gains rate. 
See id. 
 51. Knoll, supra note 13, at 4. 
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The lower capital gains rate encourages long-term investments, which are 
essential to economic growth.52 Limited partners’ returns on investment in 
private equity funds are typically subject to the capital gains rate,53 but 
general partners also manage to receive the same treatment because their 
carried interest is profit from the capital investment made by the limited 
partners. Although it is not the general partners’ money, tax law treats the 
carried interest substantively as the same form of investment return. The 
benefit to the general partner is significant: Tax on payment for 
management is the 15% capital gains rate and not the 35% income tax.54 As 
a result, managers of successful private equity funds earn millions of dollars 
more than the average American, but are taxed at a far lower rate.55 
Congressional response to the inherent tax inequalities in carried 
interest tax treatment initially occurred as the result of a working paper by 
Professor Victor Fleischer of the University of Illinois College of Law that 
addressed the carried interest tax loophole and the inherent inequalities it 
creates.56 After Professor Fleischer posted a draft of his paper online, Senate 
staff contacted him to testify in a closed-door briefing.57 Soon after his 
statements before select members of Congress,58 both the House and Senate 
drafted laws to close the tax loopholes Professor Fleischer addressed. 
However, the two bills have substantially different features. While the 
Senate bill solely addresses a tax loophole for publicly traded partnerships 
that often also use carried interest, 59 the House bill addresses partnerships 
that go public as well as taxation of managers using carried interest.60 
The House bill, H.R. 2834, addresses taxation of investment managers 
that do not provide their own capital to a partnership. The bill treats 
partnership profit interests as ordinary income if they involve “a substantial 
quantity” of investment services including: 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See Testimony of ACCF President Mark Bloomfield Before the Committee on Ways and 
Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, 105th Cong. (March 19, 1997), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_house_hearings&docid=f:4861 
6. pdf. 
 53. Knoll, supra note 13, at 4. 
 54. Solomon Testimony, supra note 36, at 3 (compensation for services is usually taxed at 
ordinary income rates). 
 55. See Fleischer, supra note 41, at 3 (“Almost nine times as many Wall Street managers 
earned over $100 million as public company CEOs; many of these top-earners on Wall Street are 
fund managers. And they pay tax on much of that income at a 15% rate, while the much-maligned 
public company CEOs, if nothing else, pay tax at a 35% rate on most of their income.”). 
 56. Fleischer, supra note 41, at 6–7. 
 57. Jerry Crimmins, He Finds His Sudden ‘Fame’ a Bit Taxing, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 20, 
2007, at 3. 
 58. Id. 
 59. S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 60. H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007). This note focuses solely on the debate over carried interest 
taxation as it affects management of private partnerships, not tax loopholes that prevent the 
corporate tax rate from applying to certain publicly traded partnerships. 
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(A) Advising the partnership as to the value of any specified asset. 
(B) Advising the partnership as to the advisability of investing in, 
purchasing, or selling any specified asset. 
(C) Managing, acquiring, or disposing of any specified asset. 
(D) Arranging financing with respect to acquiring specified assets. 
(E) Any activity in support of any service described in subparagraphs (A) 
through (D).61 
“Specified assets” include 1) securities, 2) real estate, 3) commodities, and 
4) any options or derivatives with respect to the three.62 
The bill avoids increasing taxation on capital investments to encourage 
general partners to invest their own money in the partnership, because 
partners are only taxed at the higher income rate if their portion of the 
profits does not result from a proportionate share of personal capital 
investment.63 Limited partners maintain the capital gains rate, but general 
partners are taxed at the higher income rate for any profits received solely 
as a result of management of a limited partner’s funds.64 Therefore, general 
partners are taxed at 15% if they made a proportionate capital investment to 
the other partners, but those who wish to receive compensation for their 
management services cannot take advantage of the tax loophole by 
receiving a carried interest instead of a management fee.65 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. If— 
(i) a portion of an investment services partnership interest is acquired on account of a 
contribution of invested capital, and 
(ii) the partnership makes a reasonable allocation of partnership items between the 
portion of the distributive share that is with respect to invested capital and the portion 
of such distributive share that is not with respect to invested capital, 
then subsection (a) shall not apply to the portion of the distributive share that is with 
respect to invested capital. An allocation will not be treated as reasonable for purposes 
of this subparagraph if such allocation would result in the partnership allocating a 
greater portion of income to invested capital than any other partner not providing 
services would have been allocated with respect to the same amount of invested capital. 
Id. (subsection (a) provides that generally, carried interest will be treated as general income). 
 64. See id. 
 65. See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 7. To provide some examples, 
in situation 1, the general partner is compensated with a 2% management fee and a 20% carried 
interest, but the limited partners provide all of the capital. Prior to H.R. 2834, the management fee 
would be taxed at the 35% ordinary income rate and the carried interest to the general partner 
would be taxed at the 15% capital gains rate. Subsequent to H.R. 2834, they would both be taxed 
at the 35% ordinary income rate. In situation 2, the general partner receives the same 
compensation, but he provides 10% of the capital invested. Prior to H.R. 2834, the management 
fee would be taxed at 35%, but the carried interest would be taxed at 15%. Subsequent to H.R. 
2834, the management fee would still be taxed at 35%. However, because the general partner 
provided 10% of the capital but received 20% of the profits, one-half of his carried interest would 
be taxed at the 15% capital gains rate because it was the proportionate profits to his investment. 
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Private equity firms ominously argue that the result of H.R. 2834 will 
not simply be an increased tax burden for them. Their complaints fail to 
recognize that there will be some positive effects on the market, however. 
First, tax revenues will initially increase as the result of the carried interest 
loophole closing.66 Second, taxation of investing will become more efficient 
as long-term capital investment continues to be encouraged, without 
allowing managers with limited personal capital risk to reap a 
disproportionate share of the profits.67 Finally, general partners will be 
encouraged to invest their own money if they want to maximize their own 
profits, thereby increasing their own risk and in turn protecting investors to 
a greater extent by aligning the interests of the investors and the managers.68 
IV. RECENT HISTORY OF TAXATION REFORM 
There is a long history of taxation reform and its effects on venture 
capital, though some of the most important tax changes have occurred 
within the last forty years. “Prior to 1979, pension funds were severely 
limited by” the “Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s (ERISA) 
‘prudent man’ rule.”69 Pension funds represented one of the largest groups 
of institutional investors,70 who were and are to this day responsible for a 
substantial portion of investment capital in the American economy.71 To 
expand investment opportunities, the prudent man rule was changed to 
allow managers of pension funds to invest a maximum of 10% of their 
fund’s capital in higher-risk investment opportunities, including venture 
capital funds.72 The influx of capital increased “annual new contributions to 
venture capital funds from $100–200 [million] during the 1970s to in excess 
of $4 billion by the end of the 1980s.”73 However, the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 quickly cut into that increase in capital investment when it removed 
                                                                                                                 
The remaining one-half would be taxed at 35% because it was profits paid directly as a result of 
the general managers services, not capital. 
 66. Knoll, supra note 13, at 10–12 (“[P]rivate equity funds raised more than $200 billion in 
2000 and 2006, but less than that in all other years . . . [a]ssuming $200 billion is invested each 
year in private equity funds, the additional tax collected would amount to between $2.6 billion and 
$4.2 billion a year.”). 
 67. AVIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
“CARRIED INTEREST” CONTROVERSY 2 (rev. Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.cbpp.org/7-
31-07tax.htm (“Generally speaking, a tax system is more efficient when it treats like activities 
alike: rather than having tax rates determine how people allocate their resources, it is better for the 
tax system to create a level playing field.”). 
 68. General partners will receive the same return on investment as limited partners, so their 
interests will be more aligned. See Fleischer, supra note 12, at 94–95. 
 69. Paul A. Gompers, The Rise and Fall of Venture Capital, 13 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 1, 2 
(1994). 
 70. See id. at 13 (by 1988, pension funds were the largest investors in venture capital). 
 71. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 19. 
 72. Gompers, supra note 69, at 2. 
 73. Id. 
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the lower capital gains rate and taxed capital gains as ordinary income.74 
One swift legislative move thus destroyed the main tax incentive to long-
term investment: “[V]enture-capital investment fell from roughly $4 billion 
in 1987 to under $1.4 billion” in 1991 because of the increased taxation.75 
Twenty-two years after the precipitous drop, Congress passed the Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003.76 The act lowered the 
capital gains rate to 15%, and later bills extended capital gains tax 
protection through 2010.77 Investing in the second quarter of 2007 was the 
highest since 2001.78 Clearly, taxation reform has historically had a 
dramatic effect on venture capital. 
However, the present proposed legislation has a much more limited 
scope than previous tax changes. Unlike the limitations on investment made 
by the “prudent man” rule, taxation on carried interest will only directly 
affect general partners, not investors.79 Limited partners in venture capital 
funds are still taxed at the capital gains rate because they do not use carried 
interest.80 The legislation proposed is also dissimilar to a change in the 
capital gains rate: Increased taxation of capital gains affects all investors in 
venture capital funds, but taxation of carried interest only directly affects 
venture capital managers’ profits.81 While capital gains taxation may make 
investment overall less profitable, only a tiny fraction of investors today 
who would normally be affected by broad capital gains taxation use carried 
interest.82 Venture capitalists are concerned by congressional attempts to 
increase tax on carried for one reason: profit. However, their justifications 
for maintaining the tax loophole are not quite as simple. 
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V. THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY’S RESPONSE 
Venture capital funds believe that carried interest should not be taxed as 
general income for three main reasons. First, the investment market has 
already established a cost-benefit balance that will be upset by increased 
taxation.83 Second, venture capitalists have built equity in their portfolio 
companies by providing unique management services and therefore, their 
profit should be treated as profit resulting from a capital gain.84 Finally, 
taxing carried interest will have “unintended consequences,”85 affecting a 
variety of industries that use carried interest, people that invest in those 
industries, and the American economy as a whole.86 This note addresses 
each of these arguments against carried interest taxation in turn. 
A. CHANGING THE COST/BENEFIT EQUATION 
To defend the present cost/benefit equation, venture capitalists highlight 
the economics of venture capital and the other opportunities available for 
investment. First, they believe venture capitalists will not enter the market if 
profits are decreased.87 Second, tax benefits should exist for industries such 
as venture capital that take significant business risk.88 Third, carried interest 
is a necessary incentive to managers that protects investors and encourages 
intelligent investing.89 Fourth, without the beneficial tax treatment of 
carried interest, managers will leave the venture capital industry for greener 
pastures.90 Finally, venture capital firms will be forced to transfer their 
business to foreign countries with better tax structures for investing in start-
ups.91 However, deeper review suggests the market will quickly adapt to 
taxation of carried interest and venture capitalists’ concerns are taken to an 
extreme. 
1. Decreasing Profits 
A direct effect of increased taxation will be to decrease the after-tax 
returns that managers receive from investment in portfolio companies. By 
decreasing profitability, a number of venture capitalists could be forced out 
of the market, or at least discouraged from entering it.92 However, 
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investment at levels not seen since 200193 indicates that the venture capital 
industry can withstand a shift of the cost-benefit equation. 
Venture capitalists aim to portray themselves as both powerful and 
responsible for the success of the American economy, but also weak and 
barely profitable to the point at which applying the ordinary income tax 
would force them to close up shop.94 In between 1991 and 2004, only about 
35% of U.S. venture funds generated carried interest and therefore, few 
funds were profitable.95 However, 11% generated $50 million or more, with 
eight firms earning over $500 million in carried interest.96 At first glance, 
those numbers indicate that the majority of venture capital firms cannot 
afford increased taxation. However, 11% were making enough money to be 
extremely profitable even if there were increased taxation, and if 35% of 
firms generated carried interest, then 65% of venture firms during that same 
period would not have been affected at all by a higher taxation rate. 
Furthermore, as funds mature the amount of carried interest rises 
dramatically.97 Therefore, many of those same funds can expect greater 
returns than the above figures even suggest. 
Of the 11,686 companies first funded98 between 1991 and 2000, only 
18% are known to have failed, and 47% were acquired, went public, or are 
going public.99 Considering the goal of venture capitalists is sale or an IPO, 
and public offerings typically provide exponential returns to investment,100 
those figures imply strong returns on investment. Furthermore, performance 
indices show there are positive returns on average for venture capital funds’ 
investment outlook.101 Profits that are realized in one year are equal to 
18.1% of capital invested; in ten years (the highest point) they are 21%, and 
in five years (the lowest point) they are 2.7%.102 The one-year outlook is 
almost double that of the S&P 500 and the ten-year investment outlook is 
more than triple that of the S&P 500.103 In terms of present value to venture 
capital managers, each $100 invested is worth $8.98 of carried interest and 
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$14.80 in management fees.104 It is no surprise that managers want to 
prevent carried interest legislation when the venture capital industry is 
earning such astonishing profits. 
Near-record figures indicate two things: First, venture capital remains 
an extremely attractive form of investment and therefore, it is safe to infer 
that there is no shortage of profits for limited partners.105 Second, venture 
capitalists have increasing amounts of capital invested and because 
management fees rise proportionately with capital invested and carried 
interest increases proportionately with capital invested when investments 
are profitable, there is no shortage of profits for general partners.106 Venture 
capitalists’ arguments today against increased taxation are no different from 
those made in the past, and they are entirely self-serving: “While venture 
capitalists may argue vehemently for decreases in the capital gains rate, the 
ones who would benefit most from such a reduction are the venture 
capitalists themselves.”107 
2. Encouraging Risk-Takers 
A key component to the cost-benefit equation is the level of risk that 
venture capitalists take on when helping fledging entrepreneurs develop 
their businesses. With higher risks come the possibility of greater costs and 
lower benefits. However, while encouraging risk takers is an important way 
to stimulate economic growth,108 risk also benefits the risk-taker. Risk 
occurs in all markets; attorneys on contingency, doctors, professional 
athletes, and many other professions accept risk and pay general income 
rates109 because the market automatically rewards risk-takers.110 Not only 
does the market automatically reward risk, “[t]he progressive income tax 
itself defrays risk: it takes a larger share of the gains when things turn out 
well, a smaller share when things turn out poorly, and it allows a deduction 
for losses.”111 
Lower taxes are not necessary to encourage risk-takers like venture 
capitalists. The purpose of the capital gains rate is not to encourage risk-
                                                                                                                 
 104. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 21–22. 
 105. Limited partners would not invest in funds that did not provide attractive returns on 
investment. 
 106. Assuming an efficient market in which investors will only invest when returns are likely, 
then high investment figures indicate that proportionate carried interest figures are increasing as 
well. 
 107. Gompers, supra note 69, at 23. 
 108. See Maria Giduskova & Borja Larrain, International Risk-Taking, Volatility, and 
Consumption Growth (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 06-17, 2006). 
 109. Press Release, Sen. Max Baucus, supra note 16. 
 110. Testimony Concerning The Tax Treatment of Compensation Paid to Hedge, Private Equity 
and Venture Capital Fund Managers, 110th Cong. 4 (July 11, 2007) (statement of Darryll K. 
Jones, Professor of Law, Stetson University School of Law), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/073107testdj.pdf. 
 111. ARON-DINE, supra note 67, at 8. 
496 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
taking; it is to encourage investment in capital assets.112 Therefore, the “risk 
rationale for capital gains treatment does not apply.”113 Risk-taking is also 
not always a beneficial goal because it can “encourage fund managers to 
receive more compensation in the form of risky equity rather than cash 
salary, which in turn may distort the operation of the venture capital 
markets.”114 
Venture capitalists actually assume much less risk than it appears. 
Venture capitalists claim they “invest significant portions of [their] personal 
savings,” yet admit that institutional investors provide “between 95 to 99 
[%] of the capital.”115 Those investors accept the vast majority of risk 
simply by having the most capital to lose. A manager does not accept risk 
by acquiring “an ownership interest in the enterprise betting that his upside 
will provide an ample economic reward.”116 The real risk is in the 
possibility of loss, not of gain, and managers do not truly have downside 
risk.117 Venture capitalists may believe they should be rewarded for their 
risk-taking, but the “home run mentality”118 for taking on risky ventures 
exists because they have the luxury of placing the burden of risk squarely 
on the limited partners. 
The real risk that occurs for managers is possible damage to their 
reputations.119 Because investors in a venture capital fund are typically 
passive, they evaluate managers prior to investing based on the managers’ 
investment track records before and during their investments.120 Managers 
thus have a strong incentive to maintain a good reputation if they wish to 
attract investors in the future. For that reason, reputation plays a key role in 
ensuring competence of management and protecting against opportunism,121 
not carried interest. Venture capitalists believe that risk should be 
encouraged, but their argument fails most of all because the proposed 
legislation does not remove risk from the equation; it will still encourage 
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actual risk because it will “continue to treat as capital gains the portion of 
the income attributable to a capital investment.”122 
3. Providing Incentives 
Carried interest is an important part of the cost-benefit equation because 
it creates strong incentives for venture capitalists to actively manage 
portfolio companies and maximize the potential of each investment. One 
commentator suggests, “[t]he future health of venture capital depends upon 
measures that will align the incentives of venture capital investors . . . , 
venture capitalists, and entrepreneurs who seek money to finance their 
projects.”123 Venture capitalists consider the incentive aspect of carried 
interest a necessary characteristic of investing that would be damaged by 
increased taxation. However, incentives still exist if taxation increases 
because even profits taxed 35% are better than none. 
Additionally, venture capitalists refuse to use the same incentives 
commonly found in other investment forms, but they could easily do so, 
thus weakening their argument that low carried interest taxation is their 
only incentive.124 The majority of venture capital funds do not provide the 
basic incentive structure that other private equity funds use.125 Throughout 
the private equity industry, managers’ rights to profits from investments are 
typically limited until the investors have recouped their money.126 The most 
common method is a “hurdle rate,”127 whereby proceeds of an investment 
are first distributed to the investors to recover their initial investments, then 
a set rate of return must be surpassed before the carried interest and 
remaining profits distributions include the general partner.128 Once the 
general partner meets the set rate of return, he may also be allowed to 
“catch up” so that he receives the full 20% of carried interest based on the 
entire investment and not solely on the returns after passing the hurdle.129 
The hurdle rate discourages lazy management by preventing managers from 
enjoying the benefits of investment returns when the investment has had 
limited success. By refusing to use a hurdle rate, venture capitalists “reward 
both superior and mediocre performance.”130 
A capital gains rate is not necessary to provide incentives for managers 
of venture capital. The attraction of profits itself is an incentive; profits are 
simply taxed more if carried interest is treated as general income. Greater 
profits do not occur solely due to the lower taxation rate; instead it merely 
                                                                                                                 
 122. ARON-DINE, supra note 67, at 6. 
 123. Gompers, supra note 69, at 2. 
 124. Fleischer, supra note 12, at 78. 
 125. Id. at 86. 
 126. Id. at 78. 
 127. Id. at 84. 
 128. Masotti, supra note 6, at 222. 
 129. Fleischer, supra note 12, at 84. 
 130. Id. at 86. 
498 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
“motivate[s] the current structure of compensation received by fund 
managers”.131 Venture capitalists use carried interest because it is highly 
profitable, not because an incentive would not exist otherwise. Managers 
are merely paid more handsomely for their work than they will be if 
legislation is passed. 
4. Leaving the Venture Capital Industry 
Venture capitalists also believe that the threat of lower profits will 
encourage managers to leave the industry entirely.132 Managers work in 
venture capital because carried interest is the most efficient form of 
compensation.133 If venture capital returns in the form of carried interest are 
taxed at a higher rate, some managers will be tempted to accept higher 
paying jobs elsewhere. However, that issue is more of a concern for venture 
capitalists than it should be for Congress. Creating tax incentives to 
artificially keep venture capitalists in the industry will only distort the job 
market, just as it may distort managers’ investment decisions.134 Market 
efficiencies will put the most capable people in the jobs where they will be 
the most productive.135 The government does not pay people to work in 
investment banks, so it should not tax those same workers less to encourage 
them to work in venture capital. Instead, the proposed legislation taxes 
workers according to the services they provide, not the industry in which 
they work.136 
5. Moving Offshore 
As the threat of increased carried interest taxation looms, venture 
capitalists portend a flight of their businesses out of the United States to 
countries where they will be more profitable.137 Some politicians also 
believe that increased taxation “could lead to an exodus of jobs and 
companies from New York, and even from the country.”138 Much of venture 
capitalists’ anxiety is the result of increasing competition from foreign 
markets. One indicator, “the ability of the U.S. market to attract listings of 
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foreign companies engaging in initial public offerings,”139 suggests that 
there is “a decline in the U.S. competitive position.”140 
While decreased competitiveness is a real concern for venture 
capitalists, it is unlikely that they will consider exiting the American 
market. In actuality, only the larger venture capital firms with more 
resources are capable of significantly increasing their foreign investment, 
let alone moving their businesses entirely.141 Furthermore, the United States 
still provides “superior returns” and “adequate deal flow” which will 
convince venture capitalists to remain.142 “[U.S.] venture funds formed 
between 1983 and 1998 show consistently better returns than European 
funds that commenced operations during the same period”143 and carried 
interest treatment is unlikely to substantially change the two markets’ 
disparity. 
A popular offshore location for venture capitalists that do decide to 
work offshore is the United Kingdom.144 Discussion of increasing taxation 
on carried interest has occurred recently in the United Kingdom, though 
Parliament is unlikely to pass legislation similar to H.R. 2834 or S. 1624 
and therefore, funds may be tempted to move abroad.145 In Europe, there are 
at least thirteen different countries that treat carried interest as capital 
gain.146 However, funds are not going to leave the United States simply 
because offshore jurisdictions “extend the welcome mat.”147 Venture capital 
firms will still incur U.S. taxes if they invest in companies based in the 
United States, and they can “rarely perform [management] services from 
abroad.”148 
Even if the tax benefits abroad are greater than in the United States, 
“[v]enture capitalism has done much better in America than Britain, 
although the incentive from carried interest is bigger in the latter. The 
industry’s success clearly depends on other things than tax.”149 Therefore, it 
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would be a poor tax strategy to offer beneficial tax rates simply because of a 
fear of losing venture capital business. A race to the bottom mentality does 
not work with regulation, and it will not work with taxes.150 
B. DEFINING CARRIED INTEREST AS CAPITAL GAIN 
As is evident from the previous section, there are practical market 
reasons for taxing venture capitalists the same as other private equity. In 
addition, carried interest should be taxed as general income if Congress 
views carried interest as conceptually different from capital gain. Venture 
capitalists make different arguments in their attempts to define carried 
interest as capital gain. First, they are paid by their investors for their 
knowledge and experience, intangibles shared with the very entrepreneurs 
who create a start-up and who are handsomely compensated for their own 
non-capital investments.151 Portfolio companies are valued above book 
value for those very intangibles that the venture capitalists provide, and for 
which they should be compensated.152 Second, venture capitalists’ 
contribution should be defined in terms of providing a type of capital by 
building “sweat equity” in their investments and therefore, profits are based 
on a capital investment.153 Finally, treating the services venture capitalists 
provide as capital is an efficient way to encourage investment.154 These 
arguments attempt to prove that policy requires carried interest be treated as 
capital gain. However, they dance around one main fact: Management is 
simply a service provided to investors. Services are generally taxed as 
ordinary income, not capital gain.155 Managers are paid for the advice they 
provide and by the resulting increase in the sale price of a portfolio 
company.156 
1. Compensation for Non-Capital Investments 
Venture capitalists believe that the carried interest they receive should 
be treated as capital gain because they add tangible value to a portfolio 
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company and the returns they receive in carried interest are based on that 
appreciation.157 Although management services are typically treated as 
labor for tax purposes, venture capitalists believe the value they add to an 
investment is a form of intangible capital, not labor.158 Entrepreneurs and 
investors employ venture capitalists and pay them with carried interest 
because they provide skill, knowledge and experience.159 Venture capitalists 
are unlike normal investors who solely provide money because 
management is a form of “human capital.”160 
When an entrepreneur eventually sells his business, his profit is subject 
to capital gains tax treatment.161 The entrepreneur has essentially made a 
long term investment in his company, and tax legislation does not 
differentiate between the value added to the company based on the 
entrepreneur’s financial investment and the intellectual property or human 
capital he invests.162 However, the proposed tax legislation will treat the 
human capital provided by venture capitalists and the capital provided by 
entrepreneurs very differently.163 Venture capitalists are jealous of the 
relative proposed tax treatment entrepreneurs will receive and rightfully so; 
the human capital venture capitalists provide is significant. Before venture 
capitalists step in, the entrepreneur’s company is an “original business plan” 
that is “essentially illiquid and worthless” until venture capitalists apply an 
“experienced hand.”164 Venture capitalists are instrumental in maximizing 
returns on entrepreneurship by providing both funding and expertise to a 
start-up.165 Yet they will not benefit from the lower capital gains tax if the 
proposed tax legislation is passed. 
Market valuation of companies supports the argument that venture 
capitalists can provide intangible capital.166 Venture capitalists bid on 
potential investments based on the intangibles of an entrepreneur’s ideas167 
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and those same companies are commonly valued over asset value simply 
because of intangibles like those that venture capitalists provide.168 
However, while carried interest may be a return on human capital, market 
valuation of portfolio companies alone does not explain why carried interest 
is a return on capital instead of labor. Venture capitalists must show that the 
human capital they provide, in the form of management, should not be 
treated as services just like other investment advice. 
2. Redefining Services as Sweat Equity 
Venture capitalists will attempt to define their contributions as 
necessary to avoid increased taxation. If they contribute capital to start-ups, 
then carried interest is capital gain. However, if venture capitalists provide 
services, then carried interest is general income. The problem venture 
capitalists face when trying to define carried interest as capital gain is that 
they provide very little capital; limited partners provide the lion’s share of 
money.169 Furthermore, if venture capitalists were approached for financial 
investment, then they would simply be providing high-risk credit and not 
the unique hands-on management they claim.170 Yet venture capitalists 
cannot admit to simply providing services without seeming to agree that 
carried interest is general income. Therefore, venture capitalists are forced 
to define carried interest between the two poles. 
Venture capitalists claim the result of their investment is sweat equity171 
to avoid this dilemma; their services are theoretically converted into equity 
by being an intangible capital investment.172 Although limited partners 
provide most of the money, the profits on venture capital include more than 
what the limited partners would have received if they had made similar 
investments elsewhere.173 Venture capitalists do indeed add something 
intangible, but it exits in the form of capital. They believe this justifies 
treating carried interest as a return on capital investment.174 Venture 
capitalists often use partnerships because “the appeal of the partnership 
form is its convenience as a method of pooling together labor and capital,” 
but pooling is not unique to partnerships that use carried interest.175 Returns 
on various forms of investment are often taxed as general income even 
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when “blurring”176 the line between labor and capital.177 Other business 
arrangements that pool together labor and capital only treat them as pure 
capital gain if there is a true entrepreneurial risk.178 Furthermore, the present 
proposed legislation is clearly intended to address both those situations 
when services are provided without any real financial investment, and when 
both services and capital investment are involved.179 
Venture capitalists define the services they provide equivocally to take 
advantage of tax benefits. They claim venture capital is inherently about 
creating capital investment because they take an active part in 
entrepreneurship by both investing in start-ups and actually being involved 
in business decisions while on the board of directors.180 However, while the 
capital gains rate exists to promote investment by increasing access to 
capital,181 it is not intended to benefit every person generally involved in 
investment.182 Tax legislation simply would have no way to differentiate 
between mere investors that are essentially granted board positions by 
virtue of the size of their investments (like major stockholders in 
corporations), and investors that somehow provide some type of valuable 
management. The purpose of a lower capital gains rate is to encourage 
capital formation by taxing direct investors at a lower rate, not the venture 
capitalists who manage direct investment183 and merely provide services to 
the investors. The present legislation does not propose to remove the capital 
gains rate entirely184 because there are still accepted benefits to capital 
formation.185 Taxing venture capitalists is not inconsistent with that policy 
because the portion of their equity return resulting from capital investment 
is still treated as such.186 
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3. Efficiency 
Capital gains taxation exists because making long-term capital 
investments inexpensive is an efficient way to encourage activity in the 
investment market.187 Venture capitalists believe that if encouraging long-
term capital investment is a policy goal, then the services they provide to 
long-term capital investors should be as well.188 After all, it would be 
unreasonable to expect lay investors to spend the time and energy that 
venture capitalists do in choosing investment opportunities and helping 
them grow.189 Defining carried interest as a capital gain might encourage 
more venture capital investment because potential venture capitalists would 
be attracted by the industry’s lower taxation, but it would have other, 
negative efficiency consequences. 
Carried interest is used in place of salary and other typical types of 
payment for labor, so taxing carried interest at a lower rate than “other 
forms of compensation . . . [can lead] to distortions in employment, 
organizational form and compensation decisions.”190 While other service 
industries base decisions on taxation for labor, venture capitalists structure 
their business as partnerships and use carried interest specifically because of 
tax incentives for capital investment.191 Taxing carried interest less than 
general income “violates the principles of both horizontal and vertical 
equity;” people who earn the same amounts pay different taxes merely 
because of the “form of the income” they receive and people who are paid 
more do not necessarily pay more taxes.192 If workers and investors 
structure their activities in certain forms solely based on tax reasons, then it 
is inefficient for the market because it creates “deadweight loss” by 
distorting investment behavior.193 
Applying the lower capital gains rate to carried interest is “widely 
considered to be inconsistent with basic federal income tax principles”194 
including limiting costs on the market in the form of externalities.195 
Control of externalities is crucial to an efficient economy.196 Venture capital 
creates positive externalities such as innovation,197 but carried interest 
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creates negative externalities in the form of market distortion.198 It is the job 
of the government to subsidize the positive externalities while taxing the 
negative ones.199 The proposed legislation creates a consistent and efficient 
tax policy by treating carried interest as general income, but applying the 
capital gains rate if venture capitalists invest their own capital. 
C. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SHIFTING THE TAX 
BURDEN 
Carried interest is a “common feature of partnerships” outside of the 
private equity industry.200 These partnerships may unwittingly be subjected 
to higher taxation if Congress passes the new legislation. Venture capitalists 
point out a bevy of “unintended consequences”201 that they believe will 
occur as a result of an increase in taxation on carried interest. First, 
increasing taxation will merely shift the burden to investors who will have 
to pay higher fees for investment management,202 and to the relatively poor 
investors.203 Second, increasing taxation will hurt small business, which 
relies on money from venture capital,204 and pensioners, whom the federal 
government should protect from increased taxation.205 Finally, venture 
capital investment creates jobs and sparks innovation essential to the 
American economy, and therefore the economy will be harmed by a lack of 
venture capital investment if higher taxation occurs.206 
1. Shifting the Tax Burden 
Increasing taxation on carried interest will place a heavier burden on 
general partners, but the shift is likely to be temporary.207 “A shift of the tax 
burden away from limited partners and towards general partners will likely 
lead limited partners to pay more (before tax) to general partners to 
compensate for the shift in tax burden.”208 The increased tax burden will 
probably change the way both venture capitalists and investors act in the 
market.209 If the cost of venture capital investment rises, then investors will 
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be discouraged from entering the market. General partners may also raise 
management fees, or request a larger share of the profits from the limited 
partners.210 Furthermore, venture capitalists may require more equity from 
portfolio companies in return for their investments. 
Though decreasing venture capital investment will directly affect the 
total capital available to start-ups, it will not be an unforeseen consequence 
of taxation like venture capitalists suggest. Shifting the tax burden 
commonly affects market strategies.211 By making certain forms of 
investment activity more or less expensive, taxation creates efficient 
behavior.212 The ability to shift taxation for that very purpose is the driving 
force behind tax policy.213 If taxation of carried interest increases, there will 
be fewer instances when the rate meant specifically for capital investments 
is applied to services. Presently, taxation controls the market; venture 
capitalists even select a business structure based almost entirely on tax 
benefits.214 If carried interest is taxed as general income, venture capitalists 
will act efficiently by investing solely where opportunities are profitable on 
their merits.215 Furthermore, although the tax burden may shift back to 
limited partners, congressmen have already said that carried interest 
taxation is about policy decisions and closing loopholes, not about raising 
tax revenues.216 
A result of increased carried interest taxation will also be to foreclose 
use of the capital gains rate by anyone other than capital investors. 
Somewhat ironically, venture capitalists decry increased taxation because 
only the capital-intensive investors will benefit.217 By preventing non-
capital investors from enjoying the benefits of the capital gains tax rate, the 
burden is shifted away from the rich to investors that cannot or do not 
provide tangible capital. Investors are the ones that have the wealth, while 
managers provide the real work in the form of sweat equity.218 Therefore, 
carried interest taxation “ends up penalizing labor by reserving beneficial 
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tax treatment only for the providers of capital.”219 However, there are two 
problems with such claims: first, labor is commonly taxed as general 
income220 and it is solely the carried interest loophole that would be closed; 
second, tax encourages capital formation because it benefits everyone 
indirectly,221 whereas the rich would otherwise be encouraged to keep their 
capital out of the marketplace, harming the economy. 
2. Hurting the People Using and Investing In Venture Capital 
A great deal of political capital will be required to pass carried interest 
taxation because it may negatively affect a variety of groups including 
pensioners,222 small business owners,223 real estate owners,224 and minority 
businesspeople.225 Pensioners are paying close attention to the carried 
interest debate because it could result in venture capitalists shifting greater 
costs to the investors. The remaining groups are concerned that increased 
taxation will increase the cost of capital to their businesses. However, many 
of the concerns expressed are relatively unfounded. 
Real estate investment represented only 13% of partnership income 
distributed in 2004, compared with 63% for securities partnerships,226 and it 
is only those partnerships that provide investment services that will be 
taxed.227 Ironically, minority and women investors attacking carried interest 
taxation are receiving funding from the private equity industry, which 
makes their claims seem disingenuous.228 Similarly, President Bush has also 
jumped into the debate claiming that small businesses must be protected.229 
Such support for trickle-down legislation fails because a low capital gains 
rate and therefore, also taxation on carried interest, has “modest effects” on 
“capital formation and economic activity.”230 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Burnham’s Beat, supra note 167. 
 220. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 52–53 (arguing that if 
compensation is based on services, then it should be treated as ordinary income). 
 221. Lower taxes stimulate economic growth. See JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. REPORT, supra 
note 213. 
 222. See Press Release, Citizens for Tax Justice, supra note 8 (“The private equity industry has 
tried to create the impression that public employee pensions will be damaged by this reform.”). 
 223. Kevin Drawbaugh, Business Group Backs Carried Interest Tax Break, REUTERS, Sept. 4, 
2007. 
 224. Holzer, supra note 3. 
 225. Minority Group Joins Fight Over Carried Interest, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Sept. 5, 2007, 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/09/05/minority-group-joins-fight-over-carried-interest/ 
[hereinafter Minority Group Joins Fight]. 
 226. DR. JOHN RUTLEDGE, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF 
INCREASING CARRIED INTEREST TAX RATES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (Sept. 2007), available at 
http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/espkx2nh7rnh2oeohbh253lo5guaaiucqfd4erqpaqgnvme
oron6zhpt4fcx3thuqpjtqvu6pgxb4fvw3ottf52n6sa/07carriedinterest_study.pdf. 
 227. H.R. 2834 § 710(c)(1), 110th Cong. (2007). 
 228. Minority Group Joins Fight, supra note 225. 
 229. Drawbaugh, supra note 3. 
 230. Orszag Testimony, supra note 2, at 16. 
508 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
Pensioners are not as concerned by carried interest taxation as venture 
capitalists claim. Regular investors could be hurt if general partners pass 
costs onto them, but the cost per investor should be minimal because it will 
be spread throughout entire pension funds that typically diversify their 
holdings.231 The quality of investment management should also not be 
affected by increased taxation.232 Even pension funds have agreed that 
“[t]he argument that this is about the interest of retired public employees is 
ludicrous.”233 Pensioners are unlikely to be significantly hurt by shifting 
costs because if the market had the flexibility to allow managers to charge 
greater fees, then they would have already done so.234 
3. Venture Capital’s Place in the American Economy 
Some view venture capital as the life-blood of the American economy 
because it creates jobs and sparks innovation.235 “Venture capital is the only 
industry in the proposed carried interest legislation that creates new 
companies, industries and technologies.”236 Increased taxation could result 
in decreased investment, which would slow small business growth and lead 
to a weaker economy.237 
“[T]here is considerable evidence that countries with better financial 
markets, like the United States, enjoy more rapid economic growth, which 
creates more new jobs nationwide.”238 Financial markets can easily be 
weakened when the costs of investing are too high because investors will 
put their money wherever it is cheapest to invest. “Weaker U.S. capital 
markets mean higher costs of capital for U.S. companies, reduced asset 
values, fewer jobs, and less economic activity across the entire country.”239 
However, while carried interest taxation will affect after-tax profitability for 
venture capital managers, it will not directly affect total capital invested. As 
long as venture capital is still profitable relative to other investment options, 
entrepreneurs will still have a source of investment. The American 
economy will be hurt if entrepreneurship is stifled, but venture capital 
investing will exist as long as investors are willing to provide money. 
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Changing the tax treatment of managers is simply unlikely to have a 
significant effect on entrepreneurship overall. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Venture capitalists fail to provide convincing arguments against carried 
interest taxation because tax legislation on carried interest has been 
proposed for practical policy reasons. Venture capitalists help to nurture 
small businesses in America that might fail without additional funding and 
management expertise. However, while present capital gains taxation may 
provide indirect benefits to the American economy, it also benefits venture 
capitalists in a way that creates tax inequalities. The market provides strong 
evidence that venture capitalists are able to withstand an increase in 
taxation and they are unlikely to avoid the industry or more their business to 
another country. Even with greater taxes, they will have significant 
incentives to actively manage their portfolio companies and take investment 
risks. 
Increased taxation of carried interest is also appropriate because venture 
capitalists are providing a service, even if they add tangible value to the 
companies they invest in. Regardless of how to define the contribution that 
venture capitalists provide, it is essentially different from capital 
investment. The market will be more efficient if the carried interest 
loophole is closed and investors based their decisions purely on the merit of 
their options and not the tax benefits. 
The proposed legislation is far more carefully crafted than its drafters 
are given credit for: It treats capital gains income different only in the 
unique instance that it is the result of investment services without a 
proportionate personal investment.240 Alternative tax legislation that has 
been proposed by venture capitalists and other industries that attack 
increased carried interest taxation are simply misguided. The same groups 
lobbying against the present legislation will be even more displeased if 
taxes are raised on the top 1% of income earners, or if the capital gains tax 
is raised.241 
Small business owners, minorities, pensioners, and everyone outside of 
the private equity industry should be pleased with H.R. 2834 because the 
present tax system is stacked against them. It is unreasonable to avoid an 
increase in tax for venture capitalists simply because the costs of investment 
may shift to investors or entrepreneurs in the market. The American 
economy is strong because taxation creates a relatively level playing field, 
not because Congress provides incentives for investment management. 
Although venture capital plays a vital role in nurturing promising U.S. 
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businesses, the industry will survive when venture capitalists pay taxes the 
same way as the average American. 
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